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NOTE
Condon v. Reno and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act: Was
Garcia a Bump in the Road to States' Rights?
Between 1987 and 1989, Robert John Bardo, a resident of
Tucson, Arizona, became increasingly obsessed with Rebecca
Schaeffer, an up-and-coming actress living in Hollywood, California.'
Pretending to be an old friend who wanted to send her a gift, Bardo
hired a private detective agency to find Schaeffer's address.2 The
agency had a California contact who was able to obtain the
information from the California Department of Motor Vehicles; at
the time, state law permitted the public to access the records of some
nineteen million drivers? Rather than send Ms. Schaeffer a present,
on July 18, 1989, Bardo went to her apartment, where he shot and
killed the twenty-one-year-old actress.4 The murder proved to be not
only shocking and saddening, but galvanizing as well.5 Based in large
1. See Darrell Dawsey & Paul Feldman, Police Directed to Evidence in Actress's
Death, L.A. TIMiES, July 21, 1989, pt. II, at 1; Eric Malnic, Man Who Killed TV Actress
Gets Life Without Parole,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1991, at B3. Rebecca Schaeffer played a
character on the television sitcom My Sister Sam and appeared in the movie Scenes from
the Class Struggle in Beverly Hills. See Darrell Dawsey & Eric Malnic, Actress Rebecca
Schaeffer Fatally Shot at Apartment, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1989, pt. I, at 1; see also 144
CONG. REC. S5462 (daily ed. May 22, 1998) (Sup. Docs. No. 1.1/A:144/67) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (describing Rebecca Schaeffer as a "rising television star"); 139 CONG. REC.
29,470 (1993) (Sup. Docs. No. xl.1:103/1-139/PT.20) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
(describing Rebecca Schaeffer as "a promising young actress").
2. See Robert Welkos, Public Records Led Suspect to Actress-Victim, L.A. TIMES,
July 22, 1989, pt. I, at 1.
3. See id. After Ms. Schaeffer's murder, California enacted legislation to restrict the
Department of Motor Vehicle's dissemination of personal information contained in its
records. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1808.21-.23 (West Supp. 1999); Bill Loving, DMV
Secrecy: Stalking and Suppression of Speech Rights, 4 COMMLAw CONSPECrus 203, 203
(1996). California also enacted anti-stalking legislation. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9
(West 1999); see also 138 CONG. REC. 24,813 (1992) (Sup. Docs. No. 1.1:102/2-138/PT.17)
(statement of Sen. Cohen) ("The Nation's first antistalking law was enacted in California
in 1990 after actress Rebecca Schaeffer was shot by a deranged fan.").
4. See Malnic, supranote 1, at B3. See generallyDawsey & Malnic, supra note 1, at 1
(describing the shooting death of Rebecca Schaeffer). Bardo was tried and convicted for
the murder. See Malnic, supra note 1, at B3.
5. See 140 CONG. REC. H2526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (Sup. Docs. No.
1.1/A:140/44) (statement of Rep. Goss) (noting that the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA or "the Act") "responds to the senseless murder of Rebecca Schaeffer"); Thomas
H. Odom & Gregory S. Feder, Challenging the Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act:
The Next Step in Developing a Jurisprudenceof Process-OrientedFederalism Under the
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part on this incident, Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA or "the Act"),6 which addresses the
public's access to motor vehicle records containing personal
information.7
The DPPA prohibits the release of particular personal
information8 by "a State Department of Motor Vehicles, and any
officer, employee, or contractor[] thereof," 9 subject to extensive
enumerated exceptions? The Act allows state departments of motor
vehicles (DMVs) to opt out of the restrictions, provided that the
departments give clear and conspicuous notice to operators, licensees,
and registrants that a simple signature will block the DMV from
making disclosures." Additionally, the Act constrains the release of
personal information and criminalizes the acquisition of such data

Tenth Amendment, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 88 (1998) ("Congress enacted the DPPA
primarily as an anti-stalking measure after the highly-publicized stalking death of actress
Rebecca Schaeffer .... ).
6. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 300001-300003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2099-2102 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)); see also Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-69, §
350(c), (d), 113 Stat. 986 (1999) (amending the DPPA).
7. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997), aff'd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert granted,119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999); see also 138 CONG. REC. 7105 (1992) (Sup.
Docs. No. 1.1:102/2-138/PT.5) (statement of Rep. Moran) (referencing Schaeffer's murder
in introducing the legislation that would become the DPPA); Joshua B. Sessler, Note,
Computer Cookie Control: TransactionGenerated Information andPrivacy Regulation on

the Internet, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 627, 654 (1997) (noting that the DPPA "was a response by
Congress to the stalking and murder of an actress whose personal information was
revealed via motor-vehicle records").
8. The DPPA specifically covers "information that identifies an individual, including
an individual's photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name,
address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability

information, but ... not ... information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and

driver's status." 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).

9. Id. §2721(a).

10. See id. § 2721(b). The Act mandates the disclosure of information for certain law
enforcement activity, see id., and permits disclosure for, among other things, government
agency functions, market research, employee data verification, court proceedings,
statistical analysis, insurance investigation, and notice of towings. See id. § 2721(b)(1)(14); see also id. §2721(d) (permitting state departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) to
establish waiver procedures).
11. See id. §2721(b)(11). In October 1999, Congress restructured the opt-out
provision to be an opt-in provision. See Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000, § 350(e), 113 Stat. 986. The change is effective June
1, 2000, for most states and within three months of the Supreme Court's "final decision" in
Condon for Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. See id. § 350(g)(2); see also
Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at *4-*5, Condon v. Reno, 1999 WL 962065 (No.
98-1464) (noting that after the amendment takes effect, "individuals must affirmatively
permit disclosure of information about them").
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"for any use not permitted" by the DPPA."
Despite the noble goals of the statute, 13 states have resisted
complying with the DPPA, and private parties have joined the states

in challenging the constitutionality of the legislation.' 4 Indeed, four
circuit courts of appeals"5 already had rendered decisions on the

constitutionality of the DPPA when the United States Supreme Court
granted the petition for certiorari in Condon v. Reno.16 In Condon,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DPPA violates the

Tenth Amendment.

7

By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court has

set the stage not only for a final ruling on the constitutionality of the
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2722. The penalty for a violation of the DPPA by a person-defined
as "an individual, organization or entity, but... not includ[ing] a State or agency thereof,"
id. § 2725(2)-is a fine. See id. § 2723(a). In addition, a violation of the Act by a DMV
subjects the department to "a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General [of the
United States] of not more than $5,000 a day," provided the department is shown to have
"a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance with" the Act. Id. § 2723(b).
13. Representative Moran, sponsor of the DPPA, introduced the legislation
specifically to "close a dangerous loophole in current law and protect the privacy of
individuals."
138 CONG. REC. H1785 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1992) (Sup. Docs. No.
102/1:138/44) (statement of Rep. Moran). Nevertheless, the district court in Travis v.
Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), petition
for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818), observed that "it is
doubtful whether the [Driver's Privacy Protection Act] will safeguard anyone's privacy.
The [A]ct is riddled with exceptions that any determined, resourceful person could exploit,
particularly since there are no standards for verifying the truth or accuracy of claims made
by individuals requesting information." Id at 925. Commentators have also noted the
general weakness of the DPPA. See, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection
Directive and the FirstAmendment: Why a 'Press Exemption' Won't Work, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 639, 644 (1995) ("Given the variety of public- and private-sector sources for similar
information, the efficacy of such legislation [as the DPPA] in actually stopping a
determined stalker is questionable."); George B. Stevenson, Federal Antiviolence and
Abuse Legislation: Toward Elimination of DisparateJusticefor Women and Children, 33
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 847, 874 (1997) (discussing the weakness of the DPPA in protecting
people from stalkers).
Interestingly, in the wake of Rebecca Schaeffer's murder, see supra notes 1-5 and
accompanying text, public outrage was directed not so much at the open records policy of
the California DMV as at "[tlhe presence of cheap, easily obtainable, easily concealable
handguns," Something Can Be Done, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1989, pt. V, at 4, and "'the
system that allows things like this to happen, that allows a deranged person to get his
hands on a deadly weapon.' "Id. (quoting Danna Schaeffer, Rebecca Schaeffer's mother).
14. See Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 73 nn.3-5.
15. See Pryor v. Reno, 171 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) (enjoining enforcement of
the DPPA), petitionfor cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Jul. 6, 1999) (No. 99-61); Travis,
163 F.3d at 1001-02 (upholding the validity of the DPPA); Oklahoma ex reL Okla. Dep't
of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the
validity of the DPPA), petitionfor cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. May 3,1999) (No. 981760); Condon, 155 F.3d at 456 (affirming the district court's judgment enjoining
enforcement of the DPPA).
16. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
17. See id. at 456.
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DPPA, but also for further development of its federalism
jurisprudence. 8
This Note first examines the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Condon
v. Reno. 19 The Note then traces Tenth Amendment and Commerce2
Clause jurisprudence through the late twentieth century, 1
emphasizing the development of two lines of cases: those involving
generally applicable statutes2' and those involving "commandeering"
statutes.22 Next, the Note examines the rationale of the Condon
decision and suggests that the Fourth Circuit misinterpreted and
misapplied the relevant law.23 Finally, the Note discusses the impact
that Condon may have on the Court's approach to federalism
generally.2 4
In Condon v. Reno,2 the State of South Carolina sued the United
States26 in federal district court, alleging that the DPPA
unconstitutionally encroached on state sovereignty. 7 South Carolina
sought to enjoin permanently the Federal Government from
enforcing the Act,2 which threatened to displace the state's own
legislation concerning DMV records 9 The United States defended
the constitutionality of the DPPA on the grounds that the enactment
was within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause 0 and the
Enforcement Clause.3 The district court, however, agreed with
18. See generally Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 152-67 (discussing the possible
impact that a Supreme Court decision on the DPPA would have on federalism
jurisprudence).
19. See infra notes 25-83 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 84-220 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 105-41 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 142-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 221-74 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 275-300 and accompanying text.
25. 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999).
26. The parties named in the case were Charlie Condon, Attorney General of South
Carolina, and Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States.
27. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 979.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 980-81; see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-510 to -540 (West Supp. 1998)
(describing permissible reasons and procedures for release of personal information by
state DMVs).
30. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 982. The Commerce Clause declares that "Congress
shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States .. .. " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a brief history of the commerce power, see United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-61 (1995), Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of FederalismAfter
U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 527-30 (1997), and Matthew
L. Pirnot, Note, United States v. Wilson: Did Interstate General Substantially Affect
InterstateCommerce?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 361,376-80 (1998).
31. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 986. The Enforcement Clause provides Congress
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South Carolina that the federal statute violated the Tenth
Amendment32 and granted the injunction.33 The Federal Government
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
with the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. Relying on City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the
court of appeals rejected the Enforcement Clause argument. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 463.
Because the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment functions as a remedial
power only, the court examined the DPPA for evidence that it enforced a right protected
by that Amendment. See id. at 464. In light of the availability of personal information in
other public records and the lack of "a reasonable expectation of privacy" in the type of
information contained in DMV records, the court held that the Constitution does not
protect any purported right to privacy in such information. Id at 465. Accordingly, the
Enforcement Clause could not salvage the DPPA because the Act did not offend a right
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. See generally Odom & Feder, supra
note 5, at 123-32 (discussing the unconstitutionality of the DPPA under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
32. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. South Carolina also alleged an
Eleventh Amendment violation, but because the court grounded its decision in the Tenth
Amendment, it declined to address the Eleventh Amendment challenge. See Condon, 972
F. Supp. at 979 n.3. See generally Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 134-36 (suggesting that
the DPPA may be invalid under the Eleventh Amendment). Additionally, several mediarelated intervenors challenged the DPPA on First Amendment grounds, but the district
court likewise refrained from considering that issue. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 979 n.3;
cf. Loving v. United States, 125 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 1997) (table decision), available at No.
97-6060, 1997 WL 572147 (10th Cir Sept. 8, 1997) (dismissing First Amendment challenge
to DPPA for lack of ripeness). See generally Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 134-36
(discussing the unconstitutionality of the DPPA under the First Amendment).
After the Court granted certiorari, Congress tied the DPPA to an appropriations act,
see Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350(a), (b), (e), 113 Stat. 986 (1999), in an apparent attempt to cast a
safety net for the statute using its Spending Power, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See
Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at *3, 1999 WL 962065, Reno v. Condon, (No. 981464) ("One evident purpose of Section 350(a) [of the Appropriations Act] is to tie the
DPPA's substantive restrictions on disclosure of personal information in state DMV
records to a State's receipt of federal transportation funds."). But see Supplemental Brief
for Respondents at *1, 1999 WL 975734, Reno v. Condon, (No. 98-1464) ("The
[Appropriations] Act gilds the DPPA with only the thinnest veneer of constitutional
legitimacy, a veneer which will not likely withstand even mild scrutiny by the courts
below.") In light of the Appropriations Act provision mandating that "the Secretary shall
not withhold funds provided in this Act for any grantee if a State is in noncompliance with
this provision," § 350(f), the Spending Clause argument, at first blush, seems less than
compelling. Although the Appropriations Act includes sunset provisions that allow
Congress to untie the DPPA from the Spending Clause if it fails to reenact the new
provisions, the parties to the Condon case agreed in supplemental briefs to the Supreme
Court that the legislation changed the nature of the litigation. See Supp. Brief for the
Petitioners at *7; Supp. Brief for Respondents at *2. While neither party thought that the
issues in the case were moot, they both suggested that the Court remand the case so that
all constitutional issues could be determined at once. See Supp. Brief for the Petitioners at
*9; Supp. Brief for Respondents at *1-3.
33. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 979.

222

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Circuit, which affirmed the district court's disposition of the case in a
split decision? 4 Because the DPPA regulates the states without

simultaneously regulating the private sector and thus requires the
states to administer a federal regulatory scheme, the Fourth Circuit
held that the Act impermissibly crossed the line dividing federal from

state government. 35
Judge Williams, writing for the Condon majority, began the
opinion by recounting the major features of the driver-protection
legislation. a The court then described the procedural posture of the
case, asserted its authority to review questions of statutory
constitutionality de novo,37 and defined the issue before it as
"whether the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment. '38 As an initial
point of reference, the court observed that Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause ends where the Tenth Amendment begins. 9 In
an effort to reconcile the inherent tension created by the allocation of
authority between the federal and state governments, the court set
aside the question of "whether the DPPA regulates commerce" in
order to focus on whether the Act "is consistent with the system of
dual sovereignty established by the Constitution."4 The court then
34. Judges Hamilton and Williams comprised the majority, while Senior Judge
Phillips dissented. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 455.
35. See id.
36. See iL at 456-57; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (setting
forth the text of the DPPA).
37. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458 (citing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 734 (4th Cir.
1997)). The rationale for de novo review in cases challenging the validity of federal
legislation derives from the presumption of constitutionality given to acts of Congress. See
Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 475 (1882) ("Every legislative act is to be
presumed to be a constitutional exercise of legislative power until the contrary is clearly
established .... ).
38. Condon, 155 F.3d at 457. See generally supra notes 31-32 (discussing other
grounds for the challenge).
39. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458. The exact locus of the line demarcating the Tenth
Amendment from the commerce power has varied over time. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 246-47 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (comparing cases embodying a "miserly
construction" of the commerce power vis-A-vis the Tenth Amendment to cases applying a
broad reading of that power).
40. Condon, 155 F.3d at 458. The district court likewise did not examine whether the
DPPA regulated interstate commerce. See id. at 466 n.2 (Phillips, J., dissenting); cf. Pryor
v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317,1325-26 (M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)
(discussing how the DPPA regulates interstate commerce and listing the circumstances
under which drivers' personal information may be disseminated), petitionfor cert.filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Jul. 6,1999) (No. 99-61); 139 CONG. REC. S15763 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
1993) (Sup. Does. No. 1.1A:103/1:139/159) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (discussing the
interstate commerce basis of the DPPA). But see Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 136-38
(suggesting that the DPPA "may well exceed the commerce power delegated to
Congress").
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briefly reviewed the two lines of cases that, according to the Fourth

Circuit, comprise the analytical framework for evaluating
congressional action under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment. 4 ' The validity of statutes governing states and private

entities engaged in similar commercial activity is determined by their
fidelity to the principles set forth in Garcia v. San Antonio

Metropolitan Transit Authority42 and its progeny.43 By comparison,
the validity of statutes that govern only states is determined by their
adherence to the anti-commandeering principles laid down in the
46
45
New York v. United States' and Printz v. United States line of cases.

Because the DPPA applies only to states and not to private parties,
the court concluded that the statute fell outside the Garcia line of
cases. 47 Analytically, then, the court had to consider whether the

DPPA violates the latter line of cases-the "commandeering" linewhich defines the outer boundaries of permissible congressional

action.4
The first set of cases discussed in the opinion was the "generally
applicable" line, the flagship of which is Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.4 9 This line of cases stands for the
proposition that the Constitution permits Congress to regulate state

action directly, provided that the federal legislation is generally
applicable to both private and public entities.50 The court observed,

however, that this set of cases "has not been a model of
consistency."'" Notwithstanding the inconsistency in this line of cases,
41. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458-60; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
160-61 (1992) (observing that one line of Tenth Amendment cases involves "generally
applicable laws" while the other "concerns the circumstances under which Congress may
use the States as implements of regulation").
42. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
43. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458.
44. 505 U.S. at 144; see also infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text (discussing
New York).
45. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also infra notes 156-75 (discussing Printz).
46. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458.
47. See id.
at 461-62.
48. See iL at 460.
49. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976); see infra notes 105-26 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia). Generally
applicable legislation applies equally to both private and public actors. See Condon, 155
F.3d at 461. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"general law" as applying equally to all groups).
50. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 459; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Uses and Limits
of Law: Printz and Principle?,111 HARV. L. REv. 2180,2207 & n.122 (1998).
51. Condon, 155 F.3d at 458-59. The Supreme Court has vacillated in this area over
the past three decades. Compare Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968) (upholding
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to public employees), overruled by
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the majority in Condon found the current state of the law to be clear:

"[U]nder Garciaand its progeny, Congress may... subject the States
to legislation that is also applicable to private parties." 52
The court thoroughly discussed and rejected the idea that a
Garcia analysis applied to the DPPA 3 Rather, the majority
concluded that because the Act applied only to state departments of
motor vehicles-and no private party has such a state departmentthe challenged legislation was not a law of general applicability. 4
Consequently, the court deemed an analysis under Garcia and its
progeny inappropriate. 55
After rejecting an analysis under Garcia, the court analyzed the
statute under the second line of Tenth Amendment-Commerce
Clause cases, the "commandeering" line. 6 The court focused on the
most recent cases in this line, New York v. United States57 and Printz
v. United States." This area of constitutional law involves attempts by

National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833, and Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (upholding
application of the FLSA to public employees), with National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
845 (striking down application of the FLSA to public employees), overruled by Garcia,469
U.S. at 531.
52. Condon, 155 F.3d at 459 (citing Garcia,469 U.S. at 547-56); see also infra notes
105-26 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia).
53. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-63. But see Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1003-06
(7th Cir. 1998) (discussing why Garciadoes apply to the DPPA). See generallyinfra notes
105-26 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia).
54. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461.
55. See id. at 461-62. In support of its interpretation of the Act as one not subject to
the reasoning of the "generally applicable" line of cases, the court of appeals cited two
district court cases challenging the constitutionality of the DPPA, both of which have since
been reversed. See id. (citing Travis v. Reno, 12 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (W.D. Wis. 1998),
rev'd, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), petition for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11,
1999) (No. 98-1818); Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States,
994 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (W.D. Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998), petition
for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. May 3, 1999) (No. 98-1760)).
The federal government argued that because other federal legislation regulating
private parties' disclosure of personal data is on the books, see Video Privacy Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994),
these laws in the aggregate cloak the DPPA in the mantle of "general applicability." See
Condon, 155 F.3d at 462. The Fourth Circuit disagreed. See id. at 462-63. But see Travis,
163 F.3d at 1005 ("Statute books teem with laws regulating the disclosure of information
from databases .... It is hard to name any substantial collection of information yet to be
regulated."). For a suggestion that the DPPA is generally applicable, see infra notes 24250 and accompanying text.
56. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460-63.
57. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also infranotes 142-55 and accompanying text (discussing
New York).
58. 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also infra notes 156-75 and accompanying text (discussing
Printz).
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Congress to use states to implement regulatory programs. 59 The

consonance of the opinions under this prong of the law comprises the
principle that the Condon majority presented as a straightforward
The federal government " 'may neither issue directives

aphorism:

requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States' officers ... to administer or enforce a federal regulatory

program ....

[S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with

our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.' "60 The Condon court
ultimately agreed with both the district court and the State of South
Carolina that the DPPA implicated this latter line of Commerce
Clause cases.6 '

The court compared the DPPA to the statutory provisions struck
down in New York and Printz and recognized that the DPPA neither

compelled states to legislate on the subject of disclosing motor vehicle

record data,62 nor conscripted state officials to enforce its terms.6 3
Because the DPPA charges state officers with administrationof the
Act, however, the court held that the DPPA exemplifies excessive

congressional lawmaking as defined by New York and Printz. 4 The
Act limits the disclosure of information by the state, individuals, and
organizations as well as the access to that information by individuals

and organizations. 65 The district court characterized these limitations
as "clearly" regulating the behavior of state employees whose task it

is to disseminate or withhold the personal data and of the state
citizens seeking such information. 66 The court of appeals agreed with

the district court's finding

that "Congress

passed

the DPPA

59. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 459.
60. Id. at 460 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 935).
61. See id (noting that "state officials must, as the district court found, administer the
DPPA"); see also Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 985-86 (D.S.C. 1997) (holding that
the DPPA was not a generally applicable statute, but rather one that required states to
control citizens' conduct in relation to motor vehicle records, and enjoining the
enforcement of the DPPA in South Carolina).
62. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460; see also Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1326-31
(M.D. Ala. 1998), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (comparing and contrasting the
DPPA with the legislation at issue in New York and Printz), petition for cerL filed, 68
U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Jul. 6, 1999) (No. 99-61); cf Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994) (take title provision); New
York, 505 U.S. at 174-77 (holding the take title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional).
63. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460; cf. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18
U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994) (background check provision); Printz, 521 U.S. at 918 (stating
that "the precise issue before us here ... is the forced participation of the States' executive
in the actual administration of a federal program").
64. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
65. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2722 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
66. See Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 985.
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specifically to regulate the States' control of their property (i.e., the
motor vehicle records) and to require the States in turn to regulate
their citizens' access to and use of these records."'67 After noting that
it is "perfectly clear" that Congress lacks the authority to charge state
officials with the responsibility of administering federal legislation,
the court held that the DPPA is unconstitutional.68
Senior Circuit Judge Phillips dissented on the grounds that
Congress enacted the DPPA in accordance with both its Commerce
Clause power and the "structural limitations" that the Constitution
imposes on that power.69 In disagreeing with the majority's analysis
of the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,70 the
dissent narrowly construed the scope of New York and Printz while
simultaneously broadening the reach of Garciaand its progeny.71 As
Judge Williams had done in the majority opinion, Judge Phillips
distinguished the DPPA from the federal statutes at issue in New
York and Printz.2 However, while the majority determined that the
DPPA offends the principle that prohibits Congress from conscripting
state officials,73 the Condon dissent relied on the proposition set forth

in South Carolinav. Baker:74 it is permissible for federal legislation to
cause a "'[s]tate wishing to engage in certain activity [to] take
administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with
federal standards regulating that activity.' 5 The dissent argued that
because the DPPA regulates the states directly, rather than as
intermediaries between the federal government and private citizens,76
77
Condon fit the Baker mold.
67. ld.at 985-86; see also Condon, 155 F.3d at 460 (agreeing with the district court).
68. Condon, 155 F.3d at 460 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992)).
69. Id. at 465 & n.1 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
70. See id. at 465 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the majority's analysis
on the basis that it "[p]igeonhol[ed] the Act into one of two narrow legal constructs that it
apparently believes exclusively define the Tenth Amendment's constraints on federal
power." Id. (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
71. See iL at 466-69 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 225-30, 279 and
accompanying text (suggesting that Garciadeserves a broad reading).
72. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 468 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent viewed New
York and Printz as sui generis. See id. at 468 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (referring to the
"unique question" presented by those cases).
73. See id. at 460.
74. 485 U.S. 505 (1988); see also infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text (discussing
Baker).
75. Condon, 155 F.3d at 467 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker, 485 U.S. at 514-

15).
76. See id. at 466-67 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
77. See id.at 468 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see also Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317,
1329 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (applying Baker), rev'd, 171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for
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The dissent next addressed the majority's classification of Baker
as a "generally applicable" case.7" Although the dissent conceded
that Baker involved a statute that resembles one of general
applicability, Judge Phillips's interpretation of that case, and of
Garcia, attempted to go beyond mere labeling and examined the
doctrinal underpinnings of those decisions.7 9 Judge Phillips first
observed that the tax clause under consideration in Baker applies
solely to public bonds issued by state and local government.

Therefore, the tax clause was not generally applicable in the same
sense as the statutes in Garcia and subsequent cases."0 Additionally,
Judge Phillips posited that the "generally applicable" cases "never

have intimated that only by such generally applicable legislation may
Congress, consistent with the structural limitations of federalism,

impose obligations on the states."'" Rather, reasoned the dissent, the
validity of the statutes in the "generally applicable" line of cases
emanated from their direct regulation of state conduct. 2 Because
"the DPPA does not require that states act at all," but instead applies
only when the states make a decision to participate in the interstate
market of personal information, the dissent argued that the Act does
not offend the Tenth Amendment.'

To forecast the impact of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Condon
and to predict the Supreme Court's likely resolution of the matter on

appeal, it is necessary to understand the jurisprudential origins of the
case.' The contours of federalism established by the United States
Constitution have been evolving for more than 200 years,85 and the
cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818); Recent Case, Fourth
CircuitHolds That Driver'sPrivacy ProtectionAct Violates Tenth Amendment, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1100, 1103-04 (1999) (noting similarities between Condon and Baker).
78. Condon, 155 F.3d at 467-68 (Phillips, J., dissenting).

(Phillips, J., dissenting).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 467 n.3 (Phillips, J., dissenting). But see id. at 461 n.5 (disagreeing with
the dissent's characterization of the statute at issue in Baker).
dissenting).
81. Id at 467-68 (Phillips, J.,
82. Id.at 468 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The statutes in New York and Printz, on the
other hand, attempted to indirectly regulate private conduct by interposing the states as
legislators and administrators. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992); Condon, 155 F.3d at 468 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent further
83. Condon, 155 F.3d at 468 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
characterized the DPPA as pre-emptive legislation, consistent with statutes like the
National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994), and the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). See id. at 469 (Phillips, J., dissenting).

84. Cf Printz, 521 U.S. at 925 ("Finally, and most conclusively in the present
litigation, we turn to the prior jurisprudence of this Court.").
85. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-22; THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James
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Court's decision concerning the constitutionality of the DPPA could
be another important step that defines the balance of power between
the states and federal government. The following discussion provides

a brief overview of the late twentieth-century embodiment of that
jurisprudence. 6
The fifteen-year period from 1968 to 1982 witnessed the

Supreme Court's struggle with the proper balance between the
federal government's power under the Commerce Clause and the
states' sovereign power under the Tenth Amendment. 87 During that
time, the analytical approach regarding congressional authority to
control states through legislation remained result-oriented,", but the
Court's emphasis shifted from a focus on the entities subjected to
legislation to a focus on the activities governed by legislation.8 9
Additionally, the "States as States" concept emerged during the same
time periodf 0
Under this construct, federal legislation
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The evolution of federalism began during the
infancy of the United States, as the concept of federalism embodied in the federal
constitution represented an intentional deviation from the Articles of Confederation,
under which the federal government lacked the authority to regulate the states in any
capacity. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999); DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 243-44
(2d ed. 1991); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,273 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a
fundamental component of our system that this Court has recognized time and time
again.").
86. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Theories of Federalism: Federalism Not as
Limits But as Empowerment, 45 KAN. L. REv. 1219, 1221-25 (1997) (tracing federalism in
the twentieth century); Dave Frohmayer, A New Look at Federalism: The Theory and
Implicationsof "DualSovereignty," 12 ENVTL. L. 903, 905-11 (1982) (tracing the historical
development of federalism).
87. See supra note 51; see also Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv. 84, 84-85
(1985) (noting that "[t]wice the Supreme Court has reversed itself on the question of
whether state sovereignty restricts Congress in exercising its powers under the commerce

clause [sic]").
88. See Alan R. Arkin, Comment, Inconsistencies in Modern Federalism
Jurisprudence,70 TUL. L. REV. 1569,1588 (1996).
89. Compare Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 (1968) ("If a State is engaging in
economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in
by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal
regulation."), overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), with
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 ("We hold that insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl.
3 [the Commerce Clause]."), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
90. See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845; see also infra note 107 (discussing
NationalLeague of Cities).
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unconstitutionally invaded the province of the states if it (1)
"regulate[d] the 'States as States,' "91 (2) "address[ed] matters that are
indisputably '[attributes] of state sovereignty,' "2 (3) "directly
impair[ed a state's] ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions,' "I' and (4) failed to be of such

overriding importance as to "justif[y] state submission." 94 The Court
eventually declared this test unworkable and abandoned it in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority.95

Three years before the Court disposed of the "States as States"
test, another important development in federalism emerged with the

1982 case of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi
(FERC):96

the Court pronounced that Congress has the power to try

to "induce state action in areas that otherwise would be beyond
Congress' regulatory authority."'
The State of Mississippi
challenged, on Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment grounds,
Titles I and III of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA).98 Inter alia, PURPA instructs states and non-regulated
utilities to "consider" implementing and adopting particular
standards of regulation in the field of electric and gas utilities. 99 The

Court described the Tenth Amendment issue as "somewhat novel"' °
because, rather than enacting a statute of general applicability,
Congress "attempt[ed] to use state regulatory machinery to advance
federal goals."''

The Court's analysis centered on the optional

91. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287 (1981)
(quoting NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).

92. Id.at 288 (quoting NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845 (second alteration in
original)).
93. Id.(quoting NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).

94. Id.at 288 n.29.
95. 469 U.S. 523, 546-47 (1985); see infra notes 105-26 (discussing Garcia); see also
Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1623, 1625 (1994) (arguing that "interpersonal dynamics" within the Court played a
part in the abandonment of NationalLeague of Cities).

96. 456 U.S. 742 (1982). Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. See id. at 775-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). The theory of the dissent was that the challenged
provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) offended each
prong of the Hodel test, see supra note 91-94 and accompanying text, except the fourth
prong's balancing test. See FERC,456 U.S. at 778-82,781 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part).
97. FERC,456 U.S. at 766.
98. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211
(1994); 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2645 (1994)).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a); see FERC,456 U.S. at 746.
100. FERC,456 U.S. at 758.
101. Id.
at 759.
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nature of the PURPA provisions. These provisions allow states to
administer regulations and rates unrelated to federal standards02 or
to withdraw from the utility regulation field entirely.1u The majority
held that there is no Tenth Amendment violation when the federal
government has the ability to totally pre-empt a field but instead
permits the states to enter that field on the contingency that they
legislate in harmony with federal standards."°
The Court's approach to the Tenth Amendment's limitations on
the federal commerce power changed dramatically in the mid-1980s.
The vehicle for this change, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority," is the bulwark of generally applicable statutes
under the Tenth Amendment and heralded a shift from a result-

102. See 15 U.S.C. § 3208; 16 U.S.C. § 2627(b); FERC,456 U.S. at 749-50.
103. See FERC,456 U.S. at 764.
104. See id. The Court likened the case to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), which involved a suit to enjoin the enforcement of
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 447
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999)), on the
grounds, inter alia, that it violated the Tenth Amendment. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268.
The Act required states either to submit for approval by the Secretary of the Interior a
permanent plan for regulating surface mining in conformity with standards established by
the Act or to accept a scheme created and administered by the Secretary of the Interior.
See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1253-1254 (West 1986); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 271-72. The Act imposed
on the Secretary the duty to create and administer a plan for a state. See 30 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1253-1254 (West 1986); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 271-72. Until the permanent plan was
enacted, the Surface Mining Act provided interim regulations. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1252
(West 1986).
In Hodel, the Court held that the Surface Mining Act did not violate the Tenth
Amendment because the provisions at issue directly regulated only the conduct of private
actors. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. Not only was a state government under no compulsion
to enforce the provisions of the Surface Mining Act or to spend state monies, but states
could choose not "to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner
whatsoever." Id. at 288. Congress's statutory tool permitting states to choose whether or
not to enter into the pre-emptible field was consonant with its powers under the
Constitution. See id. at 290. Although the FERC Court reasoned that PURPA presented
the states with such a choice, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, acknowledged
that "it may be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of public
utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements." FERC,456 U.S. at 767. This acknowledgment
presaged by a decade the analysis that would be New York v. United States. 505 U.S. 144
(1992). In FERC,Justice O'Connor's dissent lambasted the majority for painting PURPA
as a statute conferring options on the states. She argued that the majority's reasoning
would have caused a different outcome in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery because the
states could have chosen to discharge government employees and to shut down those parts
of the state government. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 781-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York drew
heavily on these principles. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77.
105. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
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oriented to a process-oriented analysis.'
This five-to-four decision
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery'°7-a case that stood for
the principle that Congress could not intrude on state activities that
qualified as "traditional government functions"-less than a decade
after the Court had handed down that decision. 0 8 Pursuant to
National League of Cities, the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (SAMTA), a county-run mass transit system, determined
that it was immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
106. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing the Condon court's
treatment of the "generally applicable" line of cases). But see infra notes 225-28 and
accompanying text (suggesting that Garcia'srelevance stems from analytical points other
than the generally applicable nature of the statute that was at issue).
107. 426 U.S. at 833, overruled by Garcia,469 U.S. at 528. In 1974 Congress amended
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), ch. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 203-219 (West 1998)), broadening the scope of the Act to cover federal,
state, and local governments as employers. See Pub. L. No. 93-258, 88 Stat. 55, 58-59
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 203). In response, an association of cities
joined with the National Governors' Conference and 19 states to challenge the
amendments. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836 n.7. The plaintiffs conceded
that if the newly protected employees were private sector workers, they would be within
the reach of Congress. See id. at 837. They argued that extending the terms of the FLSA
to virtually all public employees, however, upset the balance of power between the states
and the federal government. See id. The Supreme Court agreed. See id. at 845. Thus,
while Congress had successfully extended the FLSA in 1966, see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833, overruled by
Garcia,469 U.S. at 528, the Court held that the legislature, in 1974, overstepped the scope
of its power as contemplated by Article I and the Tenth Amendment. See National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. The nature of the constitutional violation was that
Congress directed its authority "to the States as States." Id. Expanding on the concept of
"States as States," the Court held "that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions," the amendments fall outside the commerce power. Id at 852.
The Court also noted that the costs of implementing the FLSA amendments would be in
the millions of dollars for the states, see id. at 846, and concluded that "the Act displace[d]
state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those
governmental services which their citizens require." Id. at 847. Consequently, California
had to reduce the number of required hours in its Highway Patrol training by more than
half. See id. at 847. The Court described the situation as a veritable Hobson's choice: the
States would either have to increase revenue, presumably by raising taxes, or cut the
provision of crucial state services like fire and police protection so that current revenue
could cover the wages and overtime of employees. See id. at 848. Despite its discussion of
the economic ramifications of the FLSA, the Court later would conclude that "the
determinative factor in [National League of Cities] was the nature of the federal action,
not the ultimate economic impact on the States." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 292 n.33. The two
factors are not so easily separated, however. While the FLSA itself was responsible for
states restructuring their pay scales and overtime policies, the economic impact on the
state or local government would be a catalyst behind that entity's rethinking the interplay
between revenue and employment. At the very least, the economic impact of the
challenged provisions would inform the decisions of state and local governments in
balancing revenue with employment. See NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847-48.
108. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 557.
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(FLSA) provisions regarding overtime pay.0 9 After SAMTA sought
a declaratory judgment to clarify the applicability of the FLSA, the
United States Secretary of Labor counterclaimed, requesting that the
Court enforce a Department of Labor opinion that had disaffirmed
SAMTA's self-determined immunity;" 0 Garcia, a SAMTA employee,
intervened, seeking overtime pay."'
The Court examined the four prerequisites to a state's immunity
from federal legislation' 2 and singled out the "traditional
governmental functions" inquiry as having created particular
difficulty in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence."' The Court, speaking
through Justice Blackmun, recognized that "the attempt to draw the
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional
governmental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent
with established principles of federalism."'1 4 Justice Blackmun
reviewed six years of opinions to illustrate the inconsistent results that
the test produced in the lower federal courts." 5
After rejecting the National League of Cities framework for
determining the boundary between federal and state power under the
Tenth Amendment, the Court looked to the Constitution and found,
"in the structure of the Federal Government itself," an intent on the
part of the Framers to preserve the position of the states within the
federal order." 6 In a striking departure from prior federalism
decisions," 7 the Court determined "that the fundamental limitation
that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to
protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of

109. See id. at 534. SAMTA's predecessor, the San Antonio Transit System, was the
entity that actually made the determination. See id. at 531.
110. See id. at 534.
111. See i.
112. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
113. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 537-39.
114. Id. at 531.
115. See id. at 538-39. Indeed, challenges to nearly identical state activities had
spawned conflicting opinions among the circuits. Compare, e.g., Molina-Estrada v. Puerto
Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845-46 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that operation of a
highway authority is a traditional governmental function), and United States v. Best, 573
F.2d 1095, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that automobile driver licensing is a traditional
governmental function), with Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that public road traffic regulation is not a traditional governmental function).
116. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51. See generally J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLIcAL PROCESS 175--84 (1980) (summarizing the extent of states'
influence in each sector of the political process).
117. See Rex E. Lee, Federalism,Separationof Powers, and the Legacy of Garcia, 1996
BYU L. REV. 329,341-42.
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result.""' The Court was referring to the political process,'19 which it
said ensures "that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated."'20 The Court specifically identified the role of the
states in the federal law-making process as the crucial element in
maintaining the proper balance in federalism.'' In the immediate
context, the Garcia Court posited that Congress's simultaneous
provision of federal subsidies to transit systems like SAMTA and
subjection of public mass transit to the FLSA illustrated the political
process's limitations on the commerce power."z ' The Court found
further evidence of the successful workings of the political process in
the fact that the FLSA imposed no more obligations on SAMTA than
it did on other public and private employers.'' This observation
appears to be the genesis of the characterization of Garcia as a
"generally applicable" case.
Justice Powell's stinging dissent first chastised the majority for
failing to recognize that the analytical framework established by
National League of Cities involved balancing the interests of a given
federal statute "against the effects of compliance on state
sovereignty."' 2 4
Justice Powell then described the majority's
framework for federalism as one in which "federal political officials,
invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of

118. Garcia,469 U.S. at 554.
119. See id.

120. Id.at 556. Before embracing process-oriented federalism, the Court considered
other standards by which to distinguish traditional and non-traditional governmental
functions. See id. at 541-45. The Court, however, rejected the proprietary-governmental
distinction, the historical standard, the uniqueness test, and the necessity test. See id
Ultimately, the problem rested with the notion that "[a]ny rule of state immunity that
looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions
inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." Id at 546. But cf EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("My personal views on [the merits of
legislation] are, however, totally irrelevant to the judicial task I am obligated to
perform.").
121. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 550-51. The Constitution originally gave the states a role
in choosing Senators by direct vote of the state legislature, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1,
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1, as well as the power to regulate voter
qualifications for both the House of Representatives and President, see id art. I, § 1, cls. 1,
3; id. art. 1, § 1, cl. 3.
122. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555. In a footnote, the Court explained that Congress's
allocation of money to SAMTA was not crucial to the decision to uphold the FLSA

amendments. See id. at 555 n.21.
123. See id at 554.
124. Id at 562 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852-53 (1976)).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

their own power."'"
Dissenting separately, Justice Rehnquist
indicated, perhaps presciently, that the rationale of National League
of Cities would "in time again command the support of a majority of
this Court."'"
Notwithstanding the Garcia dissents' "express promise[] to
disregard stare decisis issues,"'12 7 the Court strongly reaffirmed Garcia
three years later in South Carolina v. Baker12" In that case, South
125. Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting). In language similar to that of Justice Powell's,
one commentator described the process-oriented federalism engendered by Garcia: "In
refusing to enforce the tenth amendment [sic]-to play the role they regularly undertake
in respect to other provisions of the Bill of Rights-the Garcia majority leaves an
important constitutional sentry post unmanned." A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the
Values of Federalism On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles,19 GA. L.
REv. 789,796 (1985).
126. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor "share[d]
Justice Rehnquist's belief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional
responsibility." Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 285-89 and
accompanying text (discussing, in the context of the DPPA, the likelihood of a return to
the NationalLeague of Cities test).
A recent Fourth Circuit case, West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir.
1998), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 607 (1998), may shed some light on the continuing vitality of
the Garcia decision. There, the court of appeals required the parties to submit
supplemental briefs to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the FLSA as applied
to state employee salaries, in light of Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See West,
137 F.3d at 756-57. Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) in Anne Arundel County,
Maryland, sought overtime pay from the county under the terms of the FLSA because the
county had treated the EMTs as fire protection employees, who were exempt from the
overtime provisions of the Act. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(k) (West 1998); West, 137 F.3d at
757. The county argued that Printz stood for a prohibition of not only federal legislation
directing state governmental function, but also of generally applicable laws causing
excessive interference with state governmental function. See West, 137 F.3d at 758-59.
The court avoided addressing directly this characterization of Printz and instead asserted
that Garciacontrolled. See id. at 760. The Fourth Circuit panel concluded that, while the
EMTs were not engaged in the fire department's fire protection activities, they were
nevertheless exempt from FLSA overtime requirements under a different statutory
provision. See id. at 761, 764; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1) (making salaried
administrative employees exempt from overtime requirements).
Before deciding whether the federal legislation protected the plaintiffs, the court
observed the Supreme Court's shift in federalism analysis, noting that "[i]n a recent line of
cases culminating in [Printz].... the Supreme Court has imposed limits, either through the
Commerce Clause or the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, on the power of Congress to
enact legislation that affects state and local governments." West, 137 F.3d at 757-58.
Despite the court's concern that the application of the FLSA to local governments may no
longer have been "constitutionally uncontroverted," it invoked Garcia, reasoning that it
would be inappropriate for a lower federal court to second-guess its enduring validity. Id.
at 757, 760.
The fact that Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), decided
contemporaneously with Printz, applied the FLSA to a local government agency
influenced the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to treat Garciaas good law. See
West, 137 F.3d at 760.
127. Tushnet, supra note 95, at 1634.
128. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
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Carolina and the National Governors' Association (NGA) 129
challenged a provision of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility

Act of 1982 (TEFRA),10 which exempted certain bonds from federal
income tax based upon the bonds' issuance in registered, as opposed

to bearer, form."'

The Court examined South Carolina's Tenth

Amendment challenge to the Act under the assumption that the

TEFRA provision at issue "directly regulated States by prohibiting
outright the issuance of bearer bonds." 32

South Carolina asserted

two distinct arguments: first, that Congress, in enacting TEFRA,
violated the Tenth Amendment and second, that TEFRA violated
principles of intergovernmental tax immunity. 33 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, invoked Garcia and dispatched the Tenth
Amendment argument almost summarily." 4 Because South Carolina

presented no evidence that "the national political process ...
operate[d] in a defective manner," in the enactment of TEFRA, there
could be no Tenth Amendment violation. The sweeping breadth of
the Garcia political-process framework was delineated in Justice
Brennan's opinion: "Garcia left open the possibility that some

extraordinary defects in the national political process might render
congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth
Amendment.'

36

129. South Carolina originally brought suit, and the NGA intervened. See id at 510.
130. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 310(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 596. This Act was codified at 26
U.S.C. § 103(j)(1) (1982), but was repealed in 1986. See Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1301(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2602-2603. The provision, however, was still applicable
in Baker, as the facts at issue in that case took place in 1985, while the provision was still in
effect.
131. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 507-08,510-11. Registered bonds differ from bearer bonds
in three significant respects. First, ownership of the former is documented on a central
registry, whereas ownership of the latter is manifested by mere possession. See id at 507.
Second, transfer of ownership of registered bonds occurs only by revising the registration
list. By comparison, mere delivery of the bond itself effectuates a transfer of ownership
for bearer bonds. See id Finally, while registered bonds pay interest only to the entity
named on the registry, bearer bonds pay interest to whomever tenders the interest
coupon. See id
132. Id. at 511.
133. See id at 510. South Carolina argued that the TEFRA provision imposed taxes on
interest accrued on a state-issued bond. See id. at 515. After an extended discussion on
the state of the law regarding intergovernmental tax immunity, see id. at 516-27, the Court
concluded that "[t]he tax is imposed on and collected from bondholders, not states, and
any increased administrative costs incurred by states in implementing the registration
system are not 'taxes' within the meaning of the tax immunity doctrine." Id at 526.
134. See id. at 511-15.
135. Id at 512-13.
136. Id at 512. Justice Scalia attempted to dilute the almost boundless significance
given to Garciaby Justice Brennan. Justice Scalia "read [Garcia]as explicitly disclaiming
...the proposition attributed to it in today's opinion ...that the 'national political
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Using the rationale of FERC, the NGA also argued that

TEFRA's registered bond provision "commandeer[ed] the state
legislative and administrative process by coercing States into enacting
legislation authorizing bond registration and into administering the
'
registration scheme."137
The Court rejected this contention and
distinguished the TEFRA provisions from the PURPA legislation at
issue in FERC. TEFRA regulated both state and private activities
directly, while PURPA had sought only to "influence the manner in
which States regulate private parties."13 Without expressly laying
this case at the doorstep of the "generally applicable" statute theory,

the Court alluded to this underlying rationale in its rejection of South
Carolina's commandeering argument. 3 9 According to Baker, the
mere fact that states have had to change certain statutes in order to
administer a registered bond scheme does not mean that those states'
lawmaking processes have been commandeered. 40 When a state
wants to engage in conduct that necessitates administrative or
legislative action in order to comply with federal regulations, such
action "is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect."' 4
By contrast, the Supreme Court did find federal commandeering
of the states in New York v. United States.142 The State of New York
and two counties objected to the "take title" provision of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.'43 The
process' is the States' only constitutional protection, and that nothing except the
demonstration of 'some extraordinary defects' in the operation of that process can justify
judicial relief." Id at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (noting that "this Court in Garcia
has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive
exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers" (emphasis added)). Compare John C.
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1391 (1997)
(observing that the historical record demonstrates that the political process is not the sole
guardian of federalism), with Jesse H. Choper, Federalism and Judicial Review: An
Update, 21 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 577, 590 (1994) (arguing that 60 years of Supreme
Court decisions are founded on the proposition that the political process is the sole
guardian of federalism). See generally Bradford C. Clark, Translating Federalism: A
Structural Approach, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1998) ("Since Garcia, debate
has continued over whether the political safeguards of federalism should be regarded as
the exclusive, or merely the primary, means of policing federal power.").
137. Baker, 485 U.S. at 513.
138. Id. at 514; see also supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (discussing FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)).
139. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 514.
140. See id. at 514-15.
141. Id.
142. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
143. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)
(1994)).
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challenged provision required a state to take title to, possession of,
and liability for any low-level radioactive waste produced within its
144
borders for which the state had not already provided disposal.
While Congress undoubtedly intended the take title provision to
create an incentive for the states to regulate waste, the Court found
14 "crossed the line
that Congress, in enacting this "unique" provision,
1 46
distinguishing encouragement from coercion.'

Writing-for the majority, Justice O'Connor narrowed the Court's
focus: because this case did not involve generally applicable
legislation, National League of Cities/Garciadid not control, nor did
Baker.47 Instead, Justice O'Connor shifted the analysis to the
incentive and encouragement theory of federal legislation in the
Tenth Amendment context by invoking Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n'1 and FERC.49 After reaffirming the
general rule that "Congress may not simply 'commandeer the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,' "15" Justice
O'Connor turned to the challenged provision. The federal legislation
at issue gave states two alternatives: regulate as directed by Congress
or become owners of privately generated radioactive waste. The
Court held that the first "option" was clearly beyond the commerce
power and violated the Tenth Amendment. 5 ' The second "option"
was likewise invalid because it commandeered a state "into the
service of federal regulatory purposes."' 52 Because both choices
offered by the statute impermissibly infringed upon states' authority,
the statute offered no real choice at all. 53 Consequently, the statute's
144. See 42 U.S.C. §2021e(d)(2)(C). There were two other provisions challenged as
well, see New York, 505 U.S. at 152-54, but they were upheld. See id. at 173-74. In the
event that a state could not dispose of all the waste generated within its boundaries, the
take title provision was to become operative as of January 1,1996. See id. at 174-75.
145. New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
146. Id at 175.
147. See iLat 160.
148. 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see supra note 104 (discussing Hodeo.
149. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161-62; see also supra notes 96-104 (discussing FERC).

The New York Court's recognition of two distinct lines of cases was emphasized by the
Condon majority. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458-60; supra notes 41-68 and accompanying
text.
150. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
151. Id. at 175.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 175-76. The Court declined the Federal Government's invitation to
employ a balancing test to weigh the federal interests against the threat to state
sovereignty and noted that, although such an approach had been used in cases involving
generally applicable laws, see id. at 177-78 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 225, 242
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take title provision was unenforceable.
Justice White argued in dissent that the Court's recognition of
the two lines of Commerce Clause cases was without support because
"$]n no case ha[d] the Court rested its holding on such a
distinction. '154 White's dissent gave great weight to the political
process that spawned the low-level radioactive waste legislation. In
addition, Justice White argued that Garcia provided the proper
framework for analysis, despite the fact that the statute at issue was
not one of general applicability. 55
New York's prohibition on commandeering the states was
reaffirmed in Printz v. United States.56 In Printz, certain provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ("Brady Act") 57 were
challenged as unconstitutional because they required designated state
officials to perform background checks on would-be gun
purchasers.5 8 Two state officials charged under the Brady Act with
the responsibility of performing the checks "object[ed] to being
pressed into federal service, and contend[ed] that congressional
action compelling state officers to execute federal laws [was]
unconstitutional.' ' 59 After completing an exhaustive but futile search
for statutes that similarly commandeered state officials, 160 the Court
based its analysis on the structure of the Constitution.161 The majority
reasoned that, because the Constitution "contemplates that a State's
government will represent and remain accountable to its own
n.17 (1983); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976)), the Court had
"more recently departed from this approach." Id. at 178 (citing South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
556-57 (1985)). The majority also refrained from invoking the political process rationale
espoused in Garcia,despite the overwhelming evidence that the states and their executives
had encouraged and consented to the legislation. See id. at 180-81. Instead, the Court
reiterated the fundamental tenets of federalism: "the Constitution protects us from our
own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of
government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one
location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day." Id at 187.
154. Id. at 201 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "An incursion on
state sovereignty hardly seems more constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that
'commands' specific action also applies to private parties." Id. at 201-02 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. See id. at 205 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1999 & Supp.).
158. See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III)-(IV), (s)(2); Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-04. The Court
found § 922(s)(2) unconstitutional and also eliminated the duty imposed upon state
officials under § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III) and (IV). See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-35.
159. Printz,521 U.S. at 905.
160. See id. at 905-18.
161. See id. at 918-25.
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citizens,"' 6 2 control of state officers by Congress would upset the

balance of power between the federal and state levels of
government. 163 Supreme Court precedent further buttressed the
conclusion "that the Federal Government may not compel the States
to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs."' 64 In reaching its conclusion, the Court cited, among
other decisions, New York v. United States.'6s
The United States distinguished the take title provision in New
York from the background check provision in Printz on the grounds
that the latter did not require a state legislature or state executive to
make policy. 66 The Court rejected this contention because of the
obvious difficulty in line-drawing between policy-making and nonpolicy-making mandates. 67 The Court also dismissed a balancing test
suggested by the Federal Government in which the background
check's importance, efficiency, and temporary nature would
ostensibly outweigh the sovereignty interests of the states. 68 The
Court noted that such a weighing of interests could be used to
evaluate "whether the incidental application to the States of a federal
law of general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning
of state governments," but that the Brady Act's entire purpose was
"to direct the functioning of the state executive," making a balancing
test unsuitable. 69 The Court concluded by reiterating New York's
prohibition on congressional compulsion of the states and added
"that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
States' officers directly."' 170
In dissent, Justice Stevens hearkened back to Garcia and the
political process.' Given the states' and citizens' representation at
the federal level, he argued that the Court should not assume that
members of Congress will neglect the sovereignty interests of the

162. Id. at 920.
163. See id. at 921-22.
164. Id at 925. Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981),
and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), in fact, stood explicitly for this anticommandeering principle, as the federal statutes upheld in those cases "did not require the
States to enforce federal law." Printz,521 U.S. at 925.
165. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 926.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 927-28.
168. See id. at 932.
169. Id.
170. Id at 935. For an argument that Printz's "clear line" approach is flawed, see
Jackson, supra note 50, passim.
171. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 939-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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electorate. 172 A more reasonable presumption, he contended, is that
any statute that burdens state officials is the result of deliberate
contemplation that the constituents will benefit from the legislation.173
Thus, Justice Stevens echoed Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Baker 74 and Justice White's dissent in New York. 75

A brief look at the 1998 Supreme Court Term provides further
insight into the likelihood of the Supreme Court upholding the
constitutionality of the DPPA and the concomitant impact on
federalism jurisprudence. A series of decisions handed down in May
and June 1999 may indicate that the Court will continue to strengthen
states' rights. First, Alden v. Maine176 may assist in anticipating the
Court's decision in Condon. In Alden, probation officers sued the
state of Maine in its capacity as their employer, seeking overtime pay
allegedly owed to them under the FLSA. 77 Using the Eleventh
Amendment as the vehicle to reaffirm the Court's commitment to
defining the proper balance between state and federal power, a fiveJustice majority, speaking through Justice Kennedy, held that
Congress lacks the authority to empower private citizens to sue states
for damages in state court without the states' consent. 178
Citing Printz frequently, the Court examined federalism with an
eye toward "the special role of the state courts in the constitutional
design.' 1 79 Because a state's sovereign immunity, at least within its
own courts, is a function of the sovereign's consent, Congress cannot
unilaterally grant citizens a right to sue a state in that state's courts."'
Indeed, if Congress possessed such power it could "turn the State
against itself and ultimately ... commandeer the entire political

machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of

172. See id at 956 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

173. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.

175. See supra notes 154-55. Justice Stevens also argued in dissent that New York

"clearly did not decide the question presented here, whether state executive officials-as

opposed to state legislators-may in appropriate circumstances be enlisted to implement
federal policy."

Printz, 898 U.S. at 963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Additionally, he

characterized the background checks as a "minimal requirement" and distinguished
between state and county officials. Id. at 964-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
177. See id. at 2246.
178. See id Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and

Thomas joined the majority opinion. See id. Justice Souter dissented. See id. at 2269-95
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the dissenting
opinion. See id. at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2263.

180. See id at 2264.
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individuals."'' The Court explicitly reaffirmed the pre-eminence of
the United States Constitution and its Supremacy Clause vis-h-vis
state court enforcement of federal law, but observed that8 those

principles attach only when Congress acts within its authority.' 2
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Souter accused the majority of
ignoring "the accepted authority of Congress to bind States under the
FLSA and to provide for enforcement of federal rights in state
court.

'183

argument,"

After

dispensing with

the

Eleventh

Amendment

8s
the Alden dissent turned to the federalism issue.

Perhaps recognizing what may lie on the horizon,'8 6 Justice Souter

quickly noted that the Garciaholding was not at issue in the case at
hand' 87 and expressly affirmed that "Garcia remains good law, [and]
its reasoning has not been repudiated.""

The dissent explicitly

disagreed that a state's immunity to suit in its own courts is a function
of federalism 89 and noted that Alden was not a case of the federal

government coercing the states to conform to its wishes.190 Justice

Souter registered his dissatisfaction with the majority's rule, which he

believed effectively eliminated a private cause of action against state
employers in state courts. He argued that the FLSA's public remedy,
a claim brought on behalf of the injured party by the Secretary of

Labor, is of little substance.' 9 '

A month later, the Court handed down another Eleventh
Amendment case. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,19 the same five-Justice

majority' 93 struck down the portion of the Trademark Remedy
181. Id. Such a corruption of the political process would ostensibly violate the tenets of
federalism as espoused in Garciaas well. See supra notes 105-26 and accompanying text
(discussing Garcia); cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that
Congress lacks not only the power to "compel the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program," but also to "circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States'

officers directly").

182. See Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2265.
183. 1& at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting).
at 2270-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
184. See id.
at 2287-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. See id.
186. The horizon is the Condon decision.
187. See id at 2288 (Souter, J., dissenting). Garcia, like Alden, involved a challenge to
the FLSA. For the Court's historical treatment of the FLSA, see supra note 51.
188. Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189. See id.at 2288 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190. See id.at 2288 n.34 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("There is no 'commandeering' of the
State's resources where the State is asked to do no more than enforce federal law.").
at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. See id.
192. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
193. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
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Clarification Act (TRCA) 94 that purported to grant private entities a

cause of action against a state for misrepresentation in advertising. 195
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia began by restating the two
means by which individuals may sue states: (1) when Congress, acting
pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
authorizes such causes of action and (2) when the state waives its
immunity. 196 In determining that neither of these circumstances
existed, the Court relied on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida 7
and City of Boerne v. Flores.'9 8 Together, these cases stand for the
proposition that the Enforcement Clause confers upon Congress the
authority to abrogate state immunity from suit, but only when
legislation is truly remedial or preventative of constitutional
violations. 199 Justice Scalia rejected the argument that a state, by

engaging in certain conduct, impliedly consents to suit, 200 and in doing
so, he engaged in a discussion that may be useful to the DPPA
forecast.
College Savings Bank argued that the TRCA set up a
constructive waiver opportunity because the statute clearly indicated
that states engaging in particular conduct were subject to suit and that
states' participation in the qualifying conduct was voluntary.0 1 In no
uncertain terms, the Court extinguished the legal concept of
constructive waiver of sovereign immunity because precedent
requires that any waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity be
"unequivocal."' Significantly, the Court recognized that "[t]here is a
fundamental difference between a State's expressing unequivocally
that it waives its immunity, and Congress's expressing unequivocally
its intention that if the State takes certain action it shall be deemed to
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. at 2222. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, see id at 2233-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting), as did Justice Breyer with
whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. See id. at 2234-40 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
195. See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2222-23.

196. See icdat 2223 (citations omitted).
197. 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
198. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
199. See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. In a relatively terse discussion,
Justice Scalia rejected the notion that the TRCA addressed property rights that are
protected by constitutional due process. See id. at 2224-25.
200. See id. at 2226-31.
201. See id. at 2226; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994) (describing civil claims).
202. See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing Great No. Life Ins. Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (observing that a waiver of sovereign immunity must "be unequivocally
expressed").
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have waived that immunity. ' '2 3 Additionally, the Court noted that
the concept of constructive waiver does not apply to other
constitutionally protected rights and that there is no reason that a
state's right to be free from suit should implicate a different rule.2 °4
Finally, the Court discussed congressional power under the
Spending Clause20 5 and Compact Clause. 2 6 In these contexts, the
2 7
Constitution permits Congress to impose waivers of state immunity.
Although Justice Scalia conceded that Congress can use its authority
to disburse funds or to ratify interstate compacts in order to
encourage state conduct, he explained that the use of such powers is
constitutional because it effectively rewards a state for making a
particular choice.208 By contrast, when the federal government tries
to encourage state behavior by conditioning it upon the existence of
state sovereign immunity, it is no longer mere encouragement
because "the point of coercion is automatically passed-and the
voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the
refusal to2 9waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful

activity. 111

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education210 also presents
several minor points that may be relevant to the Supreme Court's
disposition of Condon. In Davis, the Court held that, in an action
against a school district, monetary damages are available to a student
who is the victim of sexual harassment by a classmate.21' In an
opinion written by Justice O'Connor, 12 over the dissent of Justice
Kennedy, 21 3 the Court determined that Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972214 represented a valid exercise of congressional
203. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
204. See idat 2229.
205. "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common defence and general Welfare of the
1.
United States .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
206. "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or

Compact with another State... ."Id art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
207. See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2231.
208. See iL
209. Id This ruling seems to reflect Justice O'Connor's dissent in FERC v. Mississippi.
456 U.S. 742, 775-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part); see supra note 96.
210. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
211. See idL at 1666.
212. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the majority opinion. See
id
213. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the dissenting
opinion. See idat 1676 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
214. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
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power under the Spending Clause and that Congress had complied
with the rule requiring a clear statement of the conditions to which
states accepting federal funding under a statute subject themselves. 215
Justice O'Connor's alignment in Davis with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer is significant, as she generally aligns with the
Davis dissenters on federalism matters. 16

The Davis dissent vehemently disagreed that Title IX complied
with the clear statement rule. 217 The result of the majority's opinion,

by Justice Kennedy's account, will be that "[t]he Nation's
schoolchildren will learn their first lessons about federalism in
classrooms where the federal government is the ever-present
regulator. ' 218
Moreover, the "federal government will have
insinuated itself ... into one of the most traditional areas of state

concern."2 19 This statement may reflect a broader willingness of the
members comprising the dissenting bloc to return to a "States as
States" type of federalism analysis. °
It has been said that "[a]scertaining the constitutional line
between federal and state power is among the most difficult judicial
tasks."'" Add to that inherent difficulty the recent trend in the
Supreme Court's treatment of federal statutes directed at the states, 21
215. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1669-70; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (holding that a clear statement by Congress to the states
itemizing the conditions of accepting federal funding is crucial to the validity of a statute
enacted under the spending power).
216. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Dr. Bill Swinford
& Dr. Eric N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Court and the States: Do Lopez and Printz
Represent a BroaderPro-State Movement?, 14 J.L. & POL. 319, 320 (1998) (noting that
before Lopez, Justice O'Connor "had made no secret of [her] desire to continue to
enhance the Court's protection of state autonomy"); Linda Greenhouse, Sex Harassment
in Class Is Ruled Schools' Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at Al (observing that
"Justice O'Connor, until now, had been a reliable ally on the states' rights side virtually
any time a case raising Federalism issues was before the Court").
217. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1677-78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. l at 1678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
219. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This language echoes National League of Cities v.
Usery-erafederalism. See supra notes 89 and 107.
220. See infra notes 273-74 and 293-95 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevance of this potential shift to the Court's upcoming decision in Condon).
221. Oklahoma ex reL Okla. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1269
(10th Cir. 1998), petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. May 3, 1999) (No. 98-1760).
222. See, e.g., id at 1272 ("[We are cognizant of the Supreme Court's trend established
by New York and Printz of striking down federal legislation which 'commandeers' state
legislative and administrative processes."); Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317, 1330 (M.D.
Ala. 1998) (adverting to "the Supreme Court's trend, indicated by New York and Printz,
of invalidating federal legislation on the grounds that it 'commandeers' state legislative
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and the conclusion that Condon stands to play a significant role in the
continuing evolution of the Court's federalism jurisprudence is
virtually inescapable.' Despite the Fourth Circuit panel's holding in
favor of the State of South Carolina, Condon is not entirely consistent
with the reasoning of either Garciaor New YorklPrintz. Ultimately,
the circuit court's sensitivity to state sovereignty is undermined by the
unsound rationale that underlies the decision to enjoin the
enforcement of the DPPA.
There are two pivotal fallacies in the majority's reasoning: its
characterization of Supreme Court precedent and its interpretation of
the DPPA. In discussing applicable Tenth Amendment precedent,
the court accurately noted that Supreme Court decisions fall roughly
into one of two lines of cases: the Garcialine or the New York/Printz
line.24 While it is arguably correct to describe the Garcialine of cases
as turning on the generally applicable nature of the relevant
legislationm the Fourth Circuit went further by portraying those
cases as holding that "Congress may only subject the States to
legislation that is also applicable to private parties."' 6 This reading of
Garciamisconstrues the rationale of that case. The GarciaCourt did
mention the general applicability of the statute at issue, 7 but it
explicitly rejected an analytical approach that would make such a
result-oriented factor the decisive element in a Tenth Amendment

and administrative processes"), rev'd,171 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.filed,
68 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Jul. 6, 1999) (No. 99-61).
223. To date, three other circuits have heard similar cases involving state challenges to
the constitutionality of the DPPA. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See
generally Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 167 ("[A]ny resolution of the DPPA litigation
other than a straightforward application of New York and Printz, promises to break new

ground.").
224. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458; see also Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1271 ("To be sure,
the Supreme Court has noted a logical distinction between generally applicable laws,
which incidentally apply to states, and law compelling States to legislate or regulate in
accordance with federal law.").
225. But see Condon, 155 F.3d at 467-68 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (arguing that in the
'generally applicable' line of cases the Supreme Court has "never ... intimated that only
by such generally applicable legislation may Congress, consistent with the structural
limitations of federalism, impose obligations on the states"). The Supreme Court "has not
had specific occasion since 1985 to reconsider" the power of Congress to impose generally
applicable legislation on states. Clark, supra note 136, at 1187 n.196.
226. Condon, 155 F.3d at 461 (emphasis added). The court cited New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992), for this proposition, but the reference was misleading.
The passages in New York attested to nothing more than the fact that the most recent
Tenth Amendment cases involved generally applicable statutes and that the statute at
issue was not generally applicable. See id.
227. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,554 (1985).
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caseP The Fourth Circuit's extrapolation was not only fallacious,2 9
but it also proved crucial to the Condon decision. 30

The Condon majority ultimately rested its decision on the anticommandeering principles of New York and Printz, but not without
considering the Federal Government's argument that those cases
apply only to statutes requiring states to regulate third parties. 31 The
court reasoned that if the commandeering cases did not apply, as the
United States argued, then Garcia must apply. 2 But Garcia was
228. See id; see also Recent Case, supra note 77, at 1102 n.34 (observing that Garcia
focused on a process-oriented analysis). Indeed, despite the similarities between the cases,
Garciadid not reaffirm the logic of the overruled Marylandv. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia,
469 U.S. at 528, which had been expressly grounded on the fact that FLSA was a generally
applicable statute. See id. at 197. In that case, 28 States and one school district challenged
the constitutionality of an amendment to the FLSA. See Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-601, § 102, 80 Stat. 831, 831 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994 & Supp.));
Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 185. The FLSA amendments, passed in 1966, extended the Act to cover
state employees working in hospitals, institutions, and schools. See Act of Sept. 23, 1966,
§ 102, 80 Stat. at 831; Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 187. Before the amendments, the FLSA expressly
had exempted state governments from its purview. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
ch. 718, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060. The Court upheld the provisions that subjected staterun hospitals and schools to the FLSA. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 187-88. The Court rejected
the States' contention "that the Act may not be constitutionally applied to state-operated
institutions because [the Commerce Clause] power must yield to state sovereignty in the
performance of governmental functions." Id. at 195. To the contrary, the Court held that
when a state participates in economic activities that Congress has validly regulated with
respect to private parties, "the State too may be forced to conform its activities to federal
regulation." ld at 197.
Justices Douglas and Stewart objected to the decision to uphold the FLSA
amendments on the grounds that they would "disrupt the fiscal policy of the States and
threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and education." Id. at 203 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). The dissent was worried not only about the overtime provisions of the Act,
but also about the impact of the Act's civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance on
the states and state officials. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1994); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 202
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed that Congress could, under the proper
circumstances, regulate state activity under the Commerce Clause. See Wirtz, 392 U.S. at
203 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, the dissent argued that Congress could not
regulate state activity when it would "overwhelm state fiscal policy," as under the FLSA.
Id. at 203 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
229. In Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998), petition for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W.
3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of the DPPA and discussed the pitfalls of Condon. See id. at 1006
(decrying the Fourth Circuit's injection of the word 'only' into the New York passage cited
in Condon); see also supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the passage from
New York).
230. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 463.
231. See id. at 461. The distinction the United States attempted to make was between
federal laws that dictate state regulation of state behavior and state regulation of its
citizens. See id.
232. See id.
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inapplicable according to the court because the DPPA is not a law of
general applicability; it does not purport to govern the disclosure of

information filed in private databases as well as public onesY33 In
reaching this conclusion, however, the court of appeals overlooked

significant aspects of both Garciaand South Carolinav. Baker.M
By shoehorning all recent Tenth Amendment cases into two
mutually exclusive and narrow categories,235 the court was forced to

label Baker as a Garcia-typecase-that is, one that involved a statute
of general applicability.3 6

In support of this characterization, the

court cited New York and Printz, both of which lumped Baker
together with other cases involving "generally applicable" statutes.2 7

But the citations to those cases are not unequivocally convincing.
The Court in New York referred to Baker as an example of a case
involving a generally applicable statute and declined to revisit its
holding?3 s Moreover, the Printz Court referred to Baker only for the
value of Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in which the Chief

Justice expressed the opinion that the minimal nature of the relevant
statute's invasion on state sovereignty should suffice to defeat the

Tenth Amendment challenge. 239 While both references may go a long
way toward establishing that the statute in Baker was generally
applicable, they fall far short of establishing either the proposition
that Baker's only proper interpretation is in the context of its
generally applicable statute or that Baker stands for the idea that only
24
through generally applicable laws can Congress regulate the States. 0
Given the impropriety of treating Baker as a commandeering case,241
233. See id.
234. See Recent Case, supra note 77, at 1102-04 & n.34; see also supra notes 105-26,
127-41 and accompanying text (discussing Garciaand Baker). Compare Condon, 155 F.3d
at 462 ("Under Garcia, a statute is constitutional only if it is generally applicable."), with
Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-Based Procedural
Protections,135 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1657 (1987) (noting that "Garcia'sprimary emphasis
[is] on procedural protections").
235. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 458; id at 465 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
236. See id. at 461 n.5.
237. See id at 461; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (citing
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,

160 (1992) (same).
238. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160.
239. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932; Baker, 485 U.S. at 529 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment).
240. Compare Condon, 155 F.3d at 461 (noting that the federal government's authority
to regulate states extends "only" to laws of general applicability), with Travis v. Reno, 163
F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit's characterization that
Congress can regulate states only through laws of general applicability), petition for cerL
filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818).
241. See Baker,485 U.S. at 514-15 (holding that TEFRA did not "commandeer" within
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the Fourth Circuit's only option in Condon was to confine Baker to
the "generally applicable" line of cases.
Arguably, by the terms of the DPPA, Condon does not belong to
the "generally applicable" line.242 On its face, the DPPA applies only
to states. 43 But on a second level, the statute does apply equally to
private and public entities. Section 2721(c) governs the resale or
redisclosure of personal information originally obtained from a state
DMV.24 Under that provision, "[a]n authorized recipient of personal
information" can redisclose or resell the information only as
stipulated in the Act.245 Thus, at the first possible opportunity, the
statute regulates private citizens' conduct in the same manner as it
regulates state conduct. In other words, because citizens do not
operate a DMV, the DPPA does not cover them as department
administrators; it does cover them, however, as soon as they disclose
or, more properly, redisclosemotor vehicle record information.
Additionally, in Travis v. Reno,246 the Seventh Circuit classified

the DPPA as legislation akin to a generally applicable statute because
federal "[s]tatute books teem with laws regulating the disclosure of
information from databases. ' 247 Moreover, the Travis court saw
profound similarities between the DPPA and TEFRA, the statute at
issue in Baker 48 Indeed, Congress directed TEFRA only at
governments as actors, while a separate statute applied to private
parties.249 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the DPPA's regulation
of government-owned databases was sufficiently analogous to the
Baker statute to justify application of that case to Wisconsin's
challenge to the DPPA.Y0 The Fourth Circuit, unfortunately, did not
follow such reasoning.
In fact, Baker is more than either a "generally applicable" case or
a failed "commandeering" case-it is a case involving the opportunity
the Tenth Amendment meaning of the term).
242. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (text of the DPPA).
243. See id. § 2721(a). The Act states that, "a State department of motor vehicles, and
any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, shall not knowingly disclose" personal
information. lI
244. See id § 2721(c).
245. Id246. 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 1998).
247. Id at 1005.
248. See iU.at 1005-06.
249. See id. at 1006.
250. See id. ("If one statute addressed only to states passes muster when other laws
place private parties under equivalent obligations, why not the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act?"). But see Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 154 n.478 (arguing that Baker is "easily
distinguished").
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to make a choice.?5' The source of Baker's significance is the
following oft-quoted212 passage: "That a State wishing to engage in
certain activity must take administrative and sometimes legislative
action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a
commonplace that presents no constitutional defect."'12 3 While the

Condon court recognized that the DPPA commandeers-in a New
York/Printz manner of speaking-neither the state legislative process
nor the state executive officials themselves, the court determined that
the Act forces the states to administer congressional legislation. 254
Rather than ending the inquiry, the court's recognition of
administration without classic commandeering should have spurred
further inquiry into the issue. Specifically, the court should have
consulted Baker.- 55 It may have recognized the similarities between
the statutes at issue in the two cases: while both required compliance,
neither required the state to engage in the relevant conduct in the
first place5 6 Additionally, both statutes applied to singularly public
conduct.257 Again, the fallacy is the court's determination that the
two lines of Tenth Amendment-Commerce Clause cases are mutually
exclusive. In the Condon court's view, if the DPPA is not generally
applicable, it qualifies for New York/Printz analysisP s Moreover,
because New York and Printz "made it perfectly clear that the
Federal Government may not require state officials to administer a
federal regulatory program," the court was left with the conclusion
that the DPPA was unconstitutional 5 9 The "commandeering" line of
cases was too blunt a tool to dissect the DPPA; Baker would have
251. TEFRA required the regulation of bonds for tax purposes, but did not require a
state to sell bonds in the first instance. See Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 103 (1994)).
252. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789,795 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(quoting Baker), affd, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999), petition for cert filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3138
(U.S. Aug. 23, 1999) (No. 99-328); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1385 (W.D.
Tex. 1994) (same), rev'd, 79 F.3d 452 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. United States v.
Gonzalez, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).
253. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988) (emphasis added).
254. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 460.
255. Cf.Oklahoma ex reL Okla. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. United States, 161 F.3d 1266,
1272 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Our conclusion that the DPPA differs from the statutes at issue in
New York and Printz is buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in Baker."), petition
for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. May 3, 1999) (No. 98-1760).
256. Accord Condon, 155 F.3d at 467 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (noting that
administration of the DPPA by DMVs "will be of [the states'] own choosing").
257. The TEFRA provision at issue dealt only with public bonds. Similarly, the DPPA
deals only with the dissemination of information by state DMVs. See Recent Case, supra
note 77, at 1103-04.
258. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 462.
259. Id.at 460.
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provided a finer instrument.

Additionally, the Condon court's statement that Congress "may
not require State officials to administer a federal regulatory
program" 260 severely dilutes the rationale of New York. The take title
provision at issue in New York was struck down because it went
beyond encouraging the states to act.261 The provision compelled,

rather than encouraged, states to conform to Congress's aspirations
because the "choices" it purported to give were not within the power
of Congress to offer. Consequently, the statute provided no
meaningful choice. 262 While certain pronouncements in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense

Board263 may signal a shift in what qualifies as "encouragement" as
opposed to "compulsion,"' '
the DPPA probably still provides
options for the states.265 First, the Act "only appl[ies] once a State
makes the voluntary choice to enter the interstate market created by
the release of personal information in its files. ' 266 Because only
thirty-four states allow easy access to personal information compiled
in DMV records,267 it is difficult to argue that the choice not to engage
in this conduct is so oppressive as to be no choice at all.2 s
Additionally, the Act has an opt-out provision that permits DMVs to

260. Ld.
261. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
262. See id. at 174-77. For a discussion of New York, see supra notes 142-55 and
accompanying text.
263. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); see also supra notes 192-209 and accompanying text
(discussing College Savings Bank).
264. See College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2231 (holding that "where the
constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the
point of coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver destroyedwhen what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise
lawful activity").
265. Cf.FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1982) (upholding Congress's
authority to exercise Commerce Clause power when the resulting legislation gave states a
choice of whether or not to participate in the regulatory scheme).
266. Condon, 155 F.3d at 468 (Phillips, J., dissenting); accord Oklahoma ex rel. Okla.
Dep't of Pub. Safety v.United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) ("If states do
not wish to comply with [the DPPA], they may stop disseminating information in their
motor vehicle records to the public. In contrast, the statute in New York offered no such
alternative to the states."), petition for cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. May 3, 1999)
(No. 98-1760).
267. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 453 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert. granted,119 S.Ct. 1753 (1999).
268. See Recent Case, supra note 77, at 1105; cf.FERC,456 U.S. at 781-82 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the "choice" of a state to either
regulate in conformity with federal standards or to stop regulating utilities as absurd and
comparing it to a choice of a state to either comply with a federal statute "dictat[ing] the
agendas and meeting places of state legislatures," or to "abolish their legislative bodies").
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disclose personal information provided that they give notice of the
possibility of disclosure and that the licensee or registrant has the

opportunity to prohibit the release by signing the same form.2 69 That
the Act provides the states with the chance to continue to disclose

information freely, subject only to an affirmative prohibition by a
citizen, seems to cleanse it of any hint of commandeering. The
requirement that the DMV provide the citizen with the opportunity

to prohibit disclosure satisfies the Baker standard for routine
compliance under a statute into the purview of which the state has

opted to come.
The two circuits that have sustained the DPPA against Tenth

Amendment challenges have employed a seductive rationale? 70 The
Seventh Circuit, in considering the same question presented in
Condon, found that the DPPA "affects states as owners of databases;

it does not affect them in their role as governments."271 Similarly, the
Tenth Circuit observed that the DPPA does not "limit[] a state's

ability to regulate in the field of automobile licensing and registration,
'
an exercise traditionally left to the states."272
These statements, while

accurate, recall the National League of Cities reasoning, which the
Court expressly abandoned in Garcia73 Nevertheless, assuming the

Fourth Circuit's division of Tenth Amendment-Commerce Clause
cases into discrete categories is correct, then the abandonment of the
"traditional governmental functions" standard should be limited to
the "generally applicable" line of cases where it originated. Because
the Fourth Circuit held that the DPPA is not generally applicable,

perhaps inquiry should be made into the nature of the governmental
activity sought to be regulated by Congress 74 Condon failed to
undertake this inquiry.
269. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11) (1994).
270. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67
U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818); Oklahoma,161 F.3d at 1272.
271. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1004.
272. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272.
273. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the Federal Government to
take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing
to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of
federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become
illusory."); George J. Thomas, The Brady Act, the Tenth Amendment, and America's Gun
Cult, 30 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 23, 27 (1999) ("While federalism has been very much in

vogue in recent years, the High Court has been reluctant to overrule Garcia explicitly.");
cf. Tushnet, supra note 95, at 1634 ("New York v. United States did not quite overrule
Garcia.").

274. But cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (rejecting a balancing
test).
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Condon v. Reno resulted in enjoining states' enforcement of the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act, a federal statute. The Fourth
Circuit's decision, however, is not the last word on the issue, as the
Supreme Court will hear the case during the 1999 Term. 75 Aside
from resolving the issue of the constitutionality of the DPPA, the case
provides an opportunity for the Supreme Court to define further the
boundary between state and federal power. The DPPA and the
Fourth Circuit's disposition of Condon present the Court with two
issues: (1) whether generally applicable statutes are the "only" means
of constitutionally regulating state conduct or whether Baker
represents a latent line of reasoning; and (2) whether it is prudent to
affirm the continuing vitality276 of Garcia's process-oriented limits to
federal authority or to return to the National League of Cities resultoriented jurisprudence.
The Condon court's statement that "[u]nder Garcia and its
progeny, Congress may only 'subject state governments to generally
applicable laws' ",277 is of such potentially sweeping consequence that
the Supreme Court must directly address this characterization.278
Garcia refused to hold that generally applicable statutes are the only
permissible vehicle by which Congress may regulate states directlyY9
Moreover, the Court's post-Garcia decisions have not embraced
explicitly such a narrow holding." ° Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
now has the opportunity to address this point and either embrace or
refute the Fourth Circuit's conclusions. If the Court agrees with the
Condon majority on the "generally applicable" issue, then it can
decline to address the applicability of Baker. Such a decision would
be a tacit suggestion that Baker's holding depended on its status as a
"generally applicable" case. On the other hand, if the Court
disagrees with the Fourth Circuit's pigeonholing of Garcia,the Court
can invoke Baker and cultivate a heretofore dormant strand of
jurisprudence. The dormant reasoning underlying Baker involves
275. See 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999) (granting certiorari). Oral arguments were heard on
November 10, 1999.
276. See Thomas, supranote 273, at 27.

277. Condon, 155 F.3d at 461 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160
(1992)).
278. Cf supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting the Court's past struggle with the
limits of federal power over the states).
279. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985); see
also supra note 154 and accompanying text (quoting Justice White's concurrence in New
York, 505 U.S. at 201, expressing disdain for the notion that general applicability could
cleanse a statute of unconstitutional invasion on state sovereignty).
280. See Clark, supra note 136, at 1187 n.196; supra notes 225-29 and accompanying
text.
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federal regulation of certain state conduct that is not addressed by a
solitary generally applicable statute. The Court could address these
circumstances by designating a new category of cases, the "states-

only" line, to serve as the analytical framework to evaluate statutes
that govern conduct in which, by definition, no private person can
engage. 81 This line would include both Baker and Condon and would

also embrace the Seventh Circuit's notion that generally applicable
legislation can derive from multiple statutes rather than a single piece

of legislation. m Indeed, the addition of such a category is necessary
because constitutional assessments of congressional power cannot be

confined to the rigid categories of "generally applicable" and
"commandeering."

Moreover, the fact that statutes like TEFRA and the DPPA defy
facile categorization indicates that a constitutional analysis that
upholds commandeering statutes "only" if they are of general

applicability cannot be sustained. This observation suggests that the
distinct categories articulated in the Fourth Circuit's opinion are

unsound.m

Significantly, Justice O'Connor may be willing to

repudiate the bright-line rule that Printz represents,,,, Perhaps the

bright line rule could be replaced by the fundamental state
sovereignty calculus that Garcia abandoned. The alternative is that
Baker and Condon, rather than serving as the vanguard of a new
category of statutes, serve instead as the vehicle for overruling Garcia
and returning to NationalLeague of Cities.

Thus, the "states-only" approach to statutes like TEFRA and the
DPPA may cross the process-result line that Garcia drew and cause

federalism analysis to revert to the "States as States" analysis
established in National League of Cities. Because some members of
the Court have indicated an inclination to return to the National

League of Cities analytical model, this retrogression may be
281. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
282. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1998) ("This is some distance
from a holding that duties imposed on state and private parties must appear in 'the same
legislation.' "), petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 11, 1999) (No. 98-1818).
283. After all, "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
284. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Printz explicitly adverted to her dissatisfaction
with the rigid rule established in that case. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court appropriately refrains from deciding
whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state
and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid."
(citation omitted)). Moreover, commentators have observed Justice O'Connor's dislike of
bright-line rules. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
ConstitutionalAdjudication,72 VA. L. REV. 543, 605 (1986).
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inevitable.a In addition to the disagreement within the Court in
deciding Garcia,last term's decision in Davis prompted a four-Justice
dissent to invoke notions of "traditional areas of state concern" in
explaining its view of Title IX. 6 This language can be traced back to
the pre-Garciaera, but whether it signals that a majority of the Court
is ready to return to the National League of Cities traditional state
functions test will have to wait until the Court's opinion in Condon.
Although it would appear at first glance that there is now a
majority to overturn Garcia-specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
along with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-such
an alignment may prove elusive. While these five Justices tend to
vote as a bloc in states' rights cases, Justice O'Connor sometimes
elevates gender issues above federalism.' This voting predisposition
may have two consequences: the DPPA may withstand the Court's
constitutional scrutiny, but the Court's holding may be fragmented.
A five-to-four split on the merits of the case could sustain the DPPA,
but the rationale underlying the decision could overrule Garcia and
return to the National League of Cities approach.m In other words,
Justice O'Connor may provide the swing vote for both the merits and
the more fundamental federalism issues underlying the case. Justice
O'Connor might vote to overrule Garcia insofar as it stands for a
285. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing then-Justice Rehnquist's
and Justice O'Connor's dissents in Garcia).
286. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1678 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 210-20 and accompanying text (discussing Davis).
287. Justice O'Connor broke from alignment with the states' rights bloc to support
women's rights in Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
834 (1992). While Casey's holding may represent a "significant retreat," Sheila M. Smith,
Comment, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sexual Harassment Law: Will the Second Female
Supreme Court Justice Become the Court's Women's Rights Champion?, 63 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1893, 1906 n.97 (1995), from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Justice O'Connor's
position in the case was indisputably more sympathetic to women's rights than that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 846
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) ("We are led to conclude this: the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed."), with id.
at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("We
believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled .... ).
Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. See id. (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Barbara Palmer, Note,
Feminist or Foe? Justice SandraDay O'Connor,Title VII Sex-Discrimination,and Support
for Women's Rights, 13 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 159, 170 (1991) (listing cases in which
Justice O'Connor "can be seen as endorsing women's rights"); Linda Greenhouse, From
the High Court,a Voice Quite Distinctly a Woman's, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at Al.
288. Justice O'Connor may side with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to
uphold the constitutionality of the Act. Justice O'Connor, however, may only concur in
the opinion, siding instead with the states' rights rationale set forth by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
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process-based approach to federalism analysis while holding that the

DPPA encroaches not on an area of traditional state concern, but on
a state activity in which a state merely chooses to engage. It is
perhaps ironic that a statute of so little substantive import could have
such a significant jurisprudential impact. 9
The Fourth Circuit's Condon opinion illustrates the confused

state of the law in the federalism arena. The current approach led the
Condon court to

conclude

that

the two

lines

of

cases-

"commandeering" and "generally applicable" -are not only mutually
exclusive, but also analytically exhaustive.29 Form was elevated over

function as the court looked no deeper than the first section of the
challenged Act.291 This analysis brought only states within the
statute's purview, forcing the court to conclude that the statute was

not generally applicable. Because the states have to administer the
statute in some sense, the court determined that it commandeered the

states, Baker's caveat notwithstanding.29

Sentiment on the Supreme Court to readdress the current model

for evaluating federalism cases293 makes the outcome of Condon
uncertain.2 9 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist has indicated his interest in
returning to the National League of Cities analytical model, and there
appear to be sufficient votes to achieve the change. 95 In light of his
289. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses of the
DPPA). Of course, it is axiomatic that the wisdom or utility of a challenged law is "totally
irrelevant to the judicial task [the Court is] obligated to perform." EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 250 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
290. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
292. See supranote 73-75 and accompanying text.
293. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579-89 (1985)
(Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting); see also West v. Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d
752, 760 (4th Cir. 1998) (adverting to the changing tide of federalism signaled by the
Supreme Court in the wake of Printz), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 607 (1998).
294. But cf. Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 152 (suggesting two possible outcomes and
noting that either "would greatly clarify Tenth Amendment jurisprudence").
295. See Martha A. Field, Address at the Twentieth Annual Law Review Symposium:
Fearand Federalism, The Meaning of Federalism,23 OHio N.U. L. REV. 1365, 1367, 1368
(1997); Swinford & Waltenburg, supra note 216, passim. Professors Swinford and
Waltenburg note the voting bloc comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas and question whether "[t]here are now five solid
votes for continued dramatic change in the way the Court defines and defends the policy
purview of the states." I& at 320. After analyzing the voting patterns in almost three
dozen cases from the 1994-96 terms, the professors concluded that "the five-justice prostate bloc on the Rehnquist Court is quite conspicuous in its coherence .... On average,
these five Justices supported the states 76% of the time in the cases discussed . . . ." Id at
357. One scholar has suggested that the Chief Justice already returned to the National
League of Cities approach. See Manning Gilbert Warren, HI, Federalism and Investor
Protection: ConstitutionalRestraintson Preemptionof State Remedies for SecuritiesFraud,
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professed interest in states' rights, Chief Justice Rehnquist's desire to
return to the previous model is ironic, as the NationalLeague of Cities
296
test did not invalidate any federal statutes on federalism grounds.
Nevertheless, an unknown factor is Justice O'Connor. Although she
joins in the majority of most of the states' rights cases, 297 Justice
O'Connor sometimes switches alignment when gender issues are
involved. 2 9 Because federalism jurisprudence is in a state of flux, and
because the DPPA is undeniably an anti-stalking statute, 2 9 Justice
O'Connor's vote is pivotal-it may be the one that keeps the DPPA
on the books and completes the Garciadissenters' prophecy. 00°
STEPHEN G. HARTZELL-JORDAN

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 169, 190 ("Two years before the Printz case,
Chief Justice Rehnquist's turn to speak finally came in Lopez v. United States, in which he
fulfilled his own Garciaprophecy."); see also Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 199, 244 ("On the surface, Printz
contains signals that NationalLeague of Cities'sresurrection is at hand.").
296. See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 1626.
297. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 287 and accompanying text; cf. Smith, supra note 287, at 1893
("[C]ommentators speculate that Justice Ginsburg's perspectives on women's issues will
result in her supporting women's rights more often, and perhaps more passionately, than
Justice O'Connor has done.").
299. See Odom & Feder, supra note 5, at 88-89; supra notes 6-12 and accompanying
text.
300. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

